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ALISA TAZHITDINOVAI am an Assistant Professor of Economics at UC Santa Barbara and a Faculty Research Fellow
at the National Bureau of Economic Research. My research interests are in public economics, labor economics, and psychology and economics. Contact Information:
Department of Economics, UCSB 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210 Email: tazhitda [at] ucsb.edu |
How to pronounce my last name? "tah-zheet-DEE-noh-vah," where "zh" is pronounced as "s" in "leisure"
PUBLICATIONS:
"Do Value-Added Taxes Affect International Trade Flows? Evidence from 30 Years of Tax Reforms,"
(with Youssef Benzarti), Conditionally Accepted, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. NBER Working Paper 26195
"Are Changes of Organizational Form Costly? Income Shifting and Business Entry Responses to Taxes"
Journal of Public Economics 2020, volume 186 (June), 104187. Publisher's Link Slides
"Do Only Tax Incentives Matter? Labor Supply and Demand Responses to an Unusually Large and Salient Tax Break"
Journal of Public Economics 2020, volume 184 (April), 104162. Publisher's Link Winner of the 2016 IIPF Peggy and Richard Musgrave Price
"Reducing Evasion Through Self-Reporting: Evidence from Charitable Contributions"
Journal of Public Economics 2018, volume 165 (September), pp. 31-47. Publisher's Link Slides
WORKING PAPERS:
"Permanent and Transitory Responses to Capital Gains Taxes: Evidence from a Lifetime Exemption in
Canada" (with Adam Lavecchia)
Using panel data on a 20% random sample of Canadian taxpayers, we study behavioral responses to the cancellation of a lifetime capital gains exemption that resulted in increased capital gains taxation for some individuals. The unique setting allows us to distinguish between short-term avoidance responses and permanent responses to capital gains taxes. We show that the exemption did not change the number of taxpayers reporting positive capital gains, and thus unlikely resulted in increased participation in capital markets. However, the exemption cancellation slightly increased capital gains realizations of the existing traders.
"Increasing Hours Worked: Moonlighting Responses to a Large Tax Reform"
Revise and Resubmit, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy NBER Working Paper 27726
Holding multiple jobs – or moonlighting – is increasingly popular in OECD countries, with 5 to 10% of workers holding two or more jobs. Yet little is known about the determinants of moonlighting and its responsive- ness to financial incentives: research has been held back by the lack of identifying variation, as most policies treat primary and secondary employments equally. This paper circumvents these limitations by studying a unique reform in Germany that allowed workers to hold small secondary jobs tax-free, thus decreasing the tax rate on secondary earnings by be- tween 19.5 to 66pp. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I document three findings. First, I find that moonlighting participation elasticities are several times larger than participation elasticities in primary employment. Second, I show that individuals do not substitute primary earnings with secondary jobs, despite the large potential savings. Third, the number of low-income jobs increased rapidly after the reform, and did not result in decreased labor supply among low-income individuals. Finally, I explore mechanisms behind the varying rates of response, and find that hour constraints and job access are key determinants of moonlighting.
Holding multiple jobs – or moonlighting – is increasingly popular in OECD countries, with 5 to 10% of workers holding two or more jobs. Yet little is known about the determinants of moonlighting and its responsive- ness to financial incentives: research has been held back by the lack of identifying variation, as most policies treat primary and secondary employments equally. This paper circumvents these limitations by studying a unique reform in Germany that allowed workers to hold small secondary jobs tax-free, thus decreasing the tax rate on secondary earnings by be- tween 19.5 to 66pp. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I document three findings. First, I find that moonlighting participation elasticities are several times larger than participation elasticities in primary employment. Second, I show that individuals do not substitute primary earnings with secondary jobs, despite the large potential savings. Third, the number of low-income jobs increased rapidly after the reform, and did not result in decreased labor supply among low-income individuals. Finally, I explore mechanisms behind the varying rates of response, and find that hour constraints and job access are key determinants of moonlighting.
"Labor Supply Responses to Payroll Taxes in the UK"
I study behavioral responses to changes in marginal tax rates of social security and income taxes. I find that responses depend on individual’s employment status: whether a worker is a wage earner, self-employed, or a proprietor. In line with the existing literature I document weak (but statistically significant) bunching at kink points of the tax schedule among wage earners. Starting from 1999, wage earners accumulate pension credits when they exceed a certain threshold, however, no contributions are due until earnings reach a second, higher threshold. Even 10 years after this reform I find no bunching to the right of the eligibility threshold, suggesting that individuals do not assign a high value to pension benefits. Lack of bunching is persistent across age groups and unlikely to be explained by friction costs as individuals are able to bunch at other kink points. I find strong responses to tax incentives among the self-employed but the responses differ by the type of kink. I find sharp bunching at the first kink, medium bunching at the top kink and weak bunching at the middle kink. Comparing responses before and after a tax reform that changed the magnitude of kinks I find that self-employed individuals aggressively reduce earnings to bunch at the lower, more salient kink points. Finally, I document large income shifting by proprietors: many firm owners report most of income as dividends thus avoiding social security taxes. Nevertheless many proprietors choose to pay themselves sub-optimally high wages thus incurring an unnecessarily high tax liability. I show that some of these proprietors pay multiples of £5,000 or £6,000.
